REAL WORLD EXPERIENCE:
The machine to the left is a Newbury Vertical insert-molding machine. The job consisted of putting metal blanks into a mold and pushing a button. Knowing from experience that T --> T --> V --> P, one can reason that a variation in cycle time can result in a fluctuation in melt temps, and in turn this effects the injection velocity and the injection pressure. In order to run consistent product the press had to maintain a 45 second cycle. Inserts go into the mold, hit cycle-start, trim parts, remove molded parts, put new inserts in... repeat. It requires quite a bit of practice to sustain a steady cycle over eight hours. I know, I started as an operator.
Client contacted me with a story about how the press was having problems, quality was all over the map, can I source Texas Instrument PLC parts for them so they can rebuild the timers. I said sure. I located the parts, they bought them and refurbished the press. Then I was contacted in regards to a new screw, that particular style of Newbury screw is not easy to find anymore. I found a screw builder for them and helped them get the existing screw refurbished.
Problems continued... so I threw some tools in a backpack, grabbed some motel-money and set off on my scooter. I arrived at the client's doorstep, introduced myself and asked to see the problem child. They took me out to the shop floor, introduced me to the operator and the press... and in an hour I was making good parts. I had to make some curious adjustments to reduce various defects... but for such an old machine it ran fast and tight. I said I'd be back the next day to see if my changes held. Next morning I went in, and was greeted by an irate production manager -- 16 hours of scrap. I spent the day sorting and classifying the defects... and told him "it's your operators on night shift. They aren't maintaining a consistent cycle." His reply was "I can't understand why we have this problem, can you stick around and observe the night shift?"
What I found... the second-shift supervisor basically put his girlfriend on the press... she sat there txting her friends and if we were running a 120 second cycle I am being generous. I stayed on for third-shift, and found that the operator in question was chemically impaired. He was a close personal friend of the third-shift supervisor... and as such the third-shift supervisor let him run the "easy job."
Corrective action was swift, it was brutal and the results were immediate. Policy is now in place to independently audit foreman and supervisor performance to prevent a repeat. Press is running a .05% scrap rate on a "bad" day.
The machine to the left is a Newbury Vertical insert-molding machine. The job consisted of putting metal blanks into a mold and pushing a button. Knowing from experience that T --> T --> V --> P, one can reason that a variation in cycle time can result in a fluctuation in melt temps, and in turn this effects the injection velocity and the injection pressure. In order to run consistent product the press had to maintain a 45 second cycle. Inserts go into the mold, hit cycle-start, trim parts, remove molded parts, put new inserts in... repeat. It requires quite a bit of practice to sustain a steady cycle over eight hours. I know, I started as an operator.
Client contacted me with a story about how the press was having problems, quality was all over the map, can I source Texas Instrument PLC parts for them so they can rebuild the timers. I said sure. I located the parts, they bought them and refurbished the press. Then I was contacted in regards to a new screw, that particular style of Newbury screw is not easy to find anymore. I found a screw builder for them and helped them get the existing screw refurbished.
Problems continued... so I threw some tools in a backpack, grabbed some motel-money and set off on my scooter. I arrived at the client's doorstep, introduced myself and asked to see the problem child. They took me out to the shop floor, introduced me to the operator and the press... and in an hour I was making good parts. I had to make some curious adjustments to reduce various defects... but for such an old machine it ran fast and tight. I said I'd be back the next day to see if my changes held. Next morning I went in, and was greeted by an irate production manager -- 16 hours of scrap. I spent the day sorting and classifying the defects... and told him "it's your operators on night shift. They aren't maintaining a consistent cycle." His reply was "I can't understand why we have this problem, can you stick around and observe the night shift?"
What I found... the second-shift supervisor basically put his girlfriend on the press... she sat there txting her friends and if we were running a 120 second cycle I am being generous. I stayed on for third-shift, and found that the operator in question was chemically impaired. He was a close personal friend of the third-shift supervisor... and as such the third-shift supervisor let him run the "easy job."
Corrective action was swift, it was brutal and the results were immediate. Policy is now in place to independently audit foreman and supervisor performance to prevent a repeat. Press is running a .05% scrap rate on a "bad" day.
A man who carries a cat by the tail learns something he can learn in no other way.
---Mark Twain
In our next example we will discuss a shop in Rochester, New York. Upon arrival I was introduced to the process engineer. In the first 90 seconds he mentioned that he had seniority seven times. From there I was introduced to the lead technician, who again reminded me that he had seniority. I was given the plant tour... shop floor consisted of a row of 1980 vintage Toshiba presses, four Windsor-Klockner presses and three very leaky Italian blow-molding machines. During the tour, I was introduced to the quality manager, the warehouse leader and the foreman. All of them reminded me multiple times of their seniority. I picked up a part from a bin and pointed out that it had a severe short-shot/underfill condition. They said that the part ran like this because of the press being worn out, I offered to take a look at the process... see if I could process around the press deficiencies. Was promptly reminded that everyone (except me) had seniority and this is the way things are here. I went ahead and corrected the process anyway, and was promptly criticized for introducing change.
Further investigation brought about the following Revelation: No one on the shop floor had ACTUAL PLASTIC PROCESSING EXPERIENCE, they were following processes and guidelines that had been written in 1988, before the senior engineer retired. They were using best-guesses based on "a little adjustment does a little good, a big adjustment is even better." Finally, certain people in the chain of command were closely related and scratched each others back. Instead of informing the owner that they needed technical training or other intervention they covered the problem with a steady succession of disposable laborers. "Clearly the problem is the workers we bring in, not us."
Over the course of six weeks I documented every bit of drama, watched the interplay, and made constructive adjustments to existing processes. In every case I was overridden by the Seniority Clique. At the end of my eight week evaluation period, I informed the owner of the problem. The owner reviewed my data and made several critical-path personnel adjustments. Company recently celebrated the acquisition of a brand new contract and their very first all-electric press.
Further investigation brought about the following Revelation: No one on the shop floor had ACTUAL PLASTIC PROCESSING EXPERIENCE, they were following processes and guidelines that had been written in 1988, before the senior engineer retired. They were using best-guesses based on "a little adjustment does a little good, a big adjustment is even better." Finally, certain people in the chain of command were closely related and scratched each others back. Instead of informing the owner that they needed technical training or other intervention they covered the problem with a steady succession of disposable laborers. "Clearly the problem is the workers we bring in, not us."
Over the course of six weeks I documented every bit of drama, watched the interplay, and made constructive adjustments to existing processes. In every case I was overridden by the Seniority Clique. At the end of my eight week evaluation period, I informed the owner of the problem. The owner reviewed my data and made several critical-path personnel adjustments. Company recently celebrated the acquisition of a brand new contract and their very first all-electric press.
Experience is what you get when you didn't get what you wanted. --Randy Pauch
When I arrived at the shop on Merrick Avenue... I was greeted by the stench of burnt acetyl. This was outside, near the visitor parking spaces. I walked in to the plant office and was promptly shuffled out, they were evacuating the plant. When I asked what happened, I was told that the operator had gone on lunch without purging the barrel empty.
First question: Is this a written procedure? They said no. Second question: Has this happened before? They said yes. Further questions established that they did not in fact have written procedures for anything. It was all verbal. Everything was retained in the minds of a handful of senior workers. If they liked you, they'd clue you in. If not, they'd "set you up the bomb."
The end result was a huge workforce turnover, SEVERE crippling accidents, hazardous conditions and very poor quality. The final question I asked: Why do you allow this to continue?
The management was introduced to a headhunting service and several quality recruiting services, and over a six week period a new shop-floor culture with new leaders and new workers was built. Company was able to bring in new talent, new talent initiated change, and change brought about a drastic improvement of product quality and on-time delivery. Company now has multiple Supplier Of Distinction awards from a regional automotive supplier, and is undergoing a period of expansion.
First question: Is this a written procedure? They said no. Second question: Has this happened before? They said yes. Further questions established that they did not in fact have written procedures for anything. It was all verbal. Everything was retained in the minds of a handful of senior workers. If they liked you, they'd clue you in. If not, they'd "set you up the bomb."
The end result was a huge workforce turnover, SEVERE crippling accidents, hazardous conditions and very poor quality. The final question I asked: Why do you allow this to continue?
The management was introduced to a headhunting service and several quality recruiting services, and over a six week period a new shop-floor culture with new leaders and new workers was built. Company was able to bring in new talent, new talent initiated change, and change brought about a drastic improvement of product quality and on-time delivery. Company now has multiple Supplier Of Distinction awards from a regional automotive supplier, and is undergoing a period of expansion.
Everything has been said before, but since nobody listens we have to keep going back and beginning all over again. --Andre Gide
ISO 9000 is a series of standards, developed and published by the International Organization for Standardization (ISO), that define, establish, and maintain an effective quality assurance system for manufacturing and service industries. Third party services verify that the system you have created is followed and documented. Basically ISO 9000 boils down to "Do What You Say, Say What You Do." Nothing more, nothing less.
The shop in question was really struggling, the owner told me that they had lost two contracts totaling 25% of their business and they were on the verge of losing another. If this happened he'd have to turn the lights off. I rolled up my sleeves and went in as an undercover worker.
I was given a knife and a paper with written instructions. Was told to trim the flash off the parts as they dropped from the press. The parts dropped with considerable force more often than not were damaged. I mentioned this to my trainer and was told to ignore it. Later when the floor-inspector came around for her hourly shot I told her. She said "we don't have an inspection point for that, we were told if it is not in the ISO Manual not to worry about it." This was my first red flag.
Next day I was assigned to a press that had 16 cavities. My job was to sort the parts by cavity ID. Cavity 1-4 were good. Cavity 5-8 were oversized but acceptable. 8-16 were oversized and unacceptable. Basically half of the product was being scrapped per shot. Given my background in Plastic Engineering I spotted the problem, the water-cooling lines for the mold were looped back on themselves, rather than having separate in-out branches for each cavity row. I tried to bring this to the attention of various people and told them I could fix it, but I was told "if ISO finds out we've made a change to the process we'll get in trouble." This was the second red-flag.
Next, I encountered a situation where the color of the product was off by a substantial amount. What was supposed to be blue was actually more greenish than blue. They were following the "ISO Specified Recipe" exactly, and getting bad results. I said "well adjust the recipe, material and master-batch changes from lot to lot." Was promptly informed that they could get fined by ISO and lose their jobs if they changed ANYTHING. Final red-flag.
I asked to see the ISO manual, I had to go to the owner after hours. The manual consisted of 25 pages of how to document and record quality issues, how to issue a corrective action, and how to verify the corrective actions were being followed. I showed him the green parts told him that they refused to issue a corrective action because they were afraid of being fired. I pointed out that the mold on one press was set up wrong, and no one wanted to fix it out of fear. Finally I showed him the parts that were damaged from falling. Again... where is the corrective action.
Problem was traced to a misunderstanding over an employee firing nearly four years ago. A worker had initiated a process correction and failed to document it... and this happened during an audit-period. The manager above the said worker fired him because it delayed the audit by a significant period and it made the manager in question look bad. Manager then instituted a policy of "DO NOT CHANGE ANYTHING -- ISO SAID SO." This was outed over three weeks of discussions, retraining and observation.
Final resolution was to retrain the workforce on the importance of correcting defective conditions and following the ISO manual. The culture was turned from one of fear to one of proactive correction. Company managed to renegotiate with one of the customers and regain several contracts while bringing new work in.
The shop in question was really struggling, the owner told me that they had lost two contracts totaling 25% of their business and they were on the verge of losing another. If this happened he'd have to turn the lights off. I rolled up my sleeves and went in as an undercover worker.
I was given a knife and a paper with written instructions. Was told to trim the flash off the parts as they dropped from the press. The parts dropped with considerable force more often than not were damaged. I mentioned this to my trainer and was told to ignore it. Later when the floor-inspector came around for her hourly shot I told her. She said "we don't have an inspection point for that, we were told if it is not in the ISO Manual not to worry about it." This was my first red flag.
Next day I was assigned to a press that had 16 cavities. My job was to sort the parts by cavity ID. Cavity 1-4 were good. Cavity 5-8 were oversized but acceptable. 8-16 were oversized and unacceptable. Basically half of the product was being scrapped per shot. Given my background in Plastic Engineering I spotted the problem, the water-cooling lines for the mold were looped back on themselves, rather than having separate in-out branches for each cavity row. I tried to bring this to the attention of various people and told them I could fix it, but I was told "if ISO finds out we've made a change to the process we'll get in trouble." This was the second red-flag.
Next, I encountered a situation where the color of the product was off by a substantial amount. What was supposed to be blue was actually more greenish than blue. They were following the "ISO Specified Recipe" exactly, and getting bad results. I said "well adjust the recipe, material and master-batch changes from lot to lot." Was promptly informed that they could get fined by ISO and lose their jobs if they changed ANYTHING. Final red-flag.
I asked to see the ISO manual, I had to go to the owner after hours. The manual consisted of 25 pages of how to document and record quality issues, how to issue a corrective action, and how to verify the corrective actions were being followed. I showed him the green parts told him that they refused to issue a corrective action because they were afraid of being fired. I pointed out that the mold on one press was set up wrong, and no one wanted to fix it out of fear. Finally I showed him the parts that were damaged from falling. Again... where is the corrective action.
Problem was traced to a misunderstanding over an employee firing nearly four years ago. A worker had initiated a process correction and failed to document it... and this happened during an audit-period. The manager above the said worker fired him because it delayed the audit by a significant period and it made the manager in question look bad. Manager then instituted a policy of "DO NOT CHANGE ANYTHING -- ISO SAID SO." This was outed over three weeks of discussions, retraining and observation.
Final resolution was to retrain the workforce on the importance of correcting defective conditions and following the ISO manual. The culture was turned from one of fear to one of proactive correction. Company managed to renegotiate with one of the customers and regain several contracts while bringing new work in.